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Abstract
This paper constructs a three-country, many-good and many-factor trade-theoretic model
in which two of the countries are in conflict and where war effort is determined endogenously
in a Nash equilibrium. The third country does not take part in the war, but trades with
the warring countries. In the framework, we examine, inter alia, how war and welfare are
affected by globalization and by two instruments available to the third country — one carrot
and one stick. Our overall conclusion is that the third parties do have the incentives for, and
can play an effective role in, conflict resolution.
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1 Introduction
There is too little trade in the world and too much war. By some estimates, the costs of
war are at least 8% of worldwide per capita consumption (Hess, 2002), excluding the cost
of lost lives. And the costs of insufficient trade are comparable, with estimates around 10%
of national income (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).1 These costs are, however, not
evenly distributed with developing countries, which are more likely to be engaged in conflict,
bearing a disproportionate share of both types of costs. Are the two phenomena related?
This question has received a lot of attention in the literature on international relations. The
literature offers many different possibilities. Conflict may disrupt trade, then again it may
foster innovation that leads to trade. Trade in defense-related goods and services of course
thrives on conflicts. Trade on the other hand may lower conflict (the classic liberal position)
or it may intensify conflict (the ‘modern realist’ position).2
For the most part, the recent theoretical literature on trade and conflict has consid-
ered bilateral relations.3,4 But bilateral relations do not usually occur in a vacuum and are
directly or indirectly influenced by the rest of the world. Moreover, third parties may not be
indifferent to the outcomes of bilateral conflicts and may indeed have strategic and economic
1Even ardent anti-globalization activists do not object to increased trade per se, but their complaints are
against the manner in which trade liberalization is being pursued by the international institutions such as
the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
2Trade reduces conflict in the liberal paradigm by increasing the opportunity costs of conflict. By con-
trast, trade increases conflict in the realist paradigm by increasing the costs of trade through creation of
vulnerabilities and loss of status. Conflict reduces trade in both paradigms, but for different reasons. Liberals
argue that wealth losses lower the opportunities for trade, while realists argue that the fear of dependency
causes nations to reduce trade. Neither paradigm discusses the possibility that conflict fosters innovation.
But the history of warfare is full of examples where innovations in war technology eventually found peaceful
uses.
For reviews of the traditional theoretical arguments see Barbieri (1996) and Reuveny (1999). As is evident
from the analysis in Barbieri (1996), there are theoretical arguments for all possible interactions between
conflict and trade. On the empirical front, Reuveny (1999) shows that support can be found for the various
theoretical arguments. For the more specific topic on the effect of globalization on conflict see, for example,
Oneal and Russett (1999) and Polachek et al. (1999).
3A growing literature follows the seminal work of Hirshleifer (1988) and develops game-theoretic models
where two rival groups allocate resources between productive and appropriative activities (see, for example,
Brito and Intriligator (1985), Hirshleifer (1989, 1991, 1995) Grossman and Kim (1996) Skaperdas (1992),
and Neary (1997)). Recent contributions by Anderton et al. (1999), and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996,
2001) emphasize trade and conflict in two-country frameworks. Anderson and Marcouiller (2004) examine
the consequences of endogenous transaction costs in trade in the form of predation on international trade.
4An exception is Haaparanta and Kuisma (2004) which will be discussed later.
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interests in such conflicts. Actions by the rest of the world may also have significant bearing
on bilateral conflicts. Understanding the role of third parties in bilateral conflicts is also
important because solutions to conflicts usually involve outsiders with their own set of prior-
ities and incentives. And unless these incentives are properly understood, it may be difficult
to achieve conflict resolution. To understand conflict resolution in a multilateral world, we
attempt to address (among others) questions about the effect of third party actions. For
instance, can the third party help resolve conflicts by using carrots such as foreign aid and
sticks such as trade sanctions? Which of the two instruments is likely to be more effective
in the resolution of conflicts?
We explore these issues in a general many-good many-factor trade-theoretic model.
Our framework has three countries that trade with each other and actions by any of the three
countries affect the relative price of one of the traded goods, the three countries being small
open economies with respect to the other goods. While previous work on trade and conflict
usually assumes a very special structure often with complete specialization, we consider a
general model that allows for incomplete specialization. Two of the three countries may
choose to direct resources from productive activity to war, while the third country may
choose tariffs and foreign aid to influence trade with the warring countries and also to affect
conflicts themselves. The conflict equilibrium is specified as a Nash one where each warring
country decides on the level of its war activity taking that of the other country and the
prices as given, and the conflict is over a factor of production. Our analysis shows that the
relationship between trade and conflict depends on relative factor intensities in the warring
countries and on the pattern of trade. Factor intensities and the pattern of trade are also
important in the choice for the rest of the world between carrot and stick policies. In
particular, we find that trade liberalization and adjustments by the rest of the world of
the policy instruments under its control can promote peace and enhance welfare for some
realistic and policy-relevant configurations.
Compared to previous work on conflict in general-equilibrium trade models, our work
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broadens the theoretical framework and focuses on conflict resolution efforts by the rest of
the world.5 Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996, 2001) consider multinational conflict in a two-
country trade model with complete factor specialization, and, in a related paper, Garfinkel
et al. (2004) consider domestic conflict with external trade. Comparing the competitive
equilibrium under autarky and free trade, they show that whether the combatants gain
or lose from trade depends on whether they are exporters or importers of the contested
good and whether the relative price under trade is higher or lower than the autarkic price.
Syropoulos (2004) also compares autarky with free trade in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework
with incomplete specialization where the terms of trade is exogenous under free trade. The
paper by Haaparanta and Kuisma (2004) considers, like the present paper, a three-country
model where two of the countries are involved in a conflict. However, the two papers are
quite different from each other both in terms of the model structure and the substantive
issues considered. In terms of the model structure, whereas Haaparanta and Kuisma (2004)
consider a pure exchange economy in which the conflict equilibrium takes into account the
effect of war activity on commodity prices, in the present model, the production side of the
economy plays an important role, and, as mentioned before, the warring countries decide
on the level of war activities taking prices — some which are determined in the general
equilibrium — as given. In terms of the substantive issues considered, they examine effects
of income in the three countries, and of trade with the third country, on the intensity of
conflict. In contrast, the focus of the present paper is on policy options for the third country
when its trading partners are involved in a conflict.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and carries out
the initial analysis. In this section the effect of globalization on the level of conflict is
examined. In section 3, after examining the possible effects of conflict on the third country
in subsection 3.1, three policy options for the third country are analyzed in sections 3.2-3.4.
Whereas sections 3.2 and 3.3 consider tariffs and foreign aid respectively one at a time, in
5Other types of multi-country models have also been used by Gowa (1994), Werner (1997), Dorussen
(1999), Dorussen and Hegreto (2004) to analyze international security issues.
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section 3.4 the third country is assumed to apply them simultaneously. In the simultaneous
application of the two instruments, we consider two different rules that tie down variations in
the instruments. Specifically, changes in tariffs and foreign aid are restricted to be revenue-
neutral for the third country in section 4.3.1 and welfare-neutral for the third country in
section 4.3.2. A conclusion summarizes our main results.
2 Model and Initial Analysis
We develop a three-country, many-good, many-factor model with two of the countries —
called country a and country b — engaged in a war with each other and a third country —
called country c — that does not take part in the war but trades with the warring countries.
All product and factor markets are perfectly competitive and country c imposes tariffs on
imports from country a and b. There are many inelastically supplied factors of production;
however, two of the factors play important roles in our analysis. For expositional ease, we
shall call these factors labor and land although one could interpret them differently. Labor
is used to fight the war and land is what they fight for. We define f(Las , L
b
s) as the net gain
of land by country a from war,6 where Las and L
b
s are respectively the amount of ‘soldiers’
employed by country a and b.7 For this net-gain function we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 f(·) is homogeneous of degree zero in the two arguments and satisfies: f1 >
0, f2 < 0, f11 < 0, f22 > 0, and f12 < 0.
The production side of the economies indexed by i = a, b, c is described the three
revenue functions Ra(p, L¯a − Las , V¯ a + f(Las , Lbs)), Rb(p, L¯b − Lbs, V¯ b − f(Las , Lbs)) and Rc(p+
t, L¯c, V¯ c) where L¯i and V¯ i are the endowments of labor and land respectively in country i,
p is the international price vector of the non-numeraire goods, and t is the vector of specific
6This can be viewed as the reduced form of a ‘contest’ payoff function.
7The net gain function takes negative values when country b ‘wins’ the war.
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tariff rates imposed by country c.8 We assume that the two factors are complements, i.e.,
Ri23 > 0, i = a, b, c.
The consumption side of the economies is represented by the expenditure functions
Ea(p, ua), Eb(p, ub) andEc(p+t, uc), where ui is the utility level of a representative consumer
in country i (i = a, b, c).9
The income-expenditure balance equations of consumers in the three countries are
given by:
Ea (p, ua) = Ra
(
p, L¯a − Las , V¯ a + f
(
Las , L
b
s
))
+ λF, (1)
Eb
(
p, ub
)
= Rb
(
p, L¯b − Lbs, V¯ b − f
(
Las , L
b
s
))
+ (1− λ)F, (2)
Ec (p+ t, uc) = Rc
(
p+ t, L¯c, V¯ c
)
+ t(Ec1 −Rc1)− F, (3)
where F is the amount of aid given out by country c and λ is the proportion of it going to
country a. It is assumed that aid is financed by lump-sum taxation of the consumers in the
donor country.
We assume that the three countries are small open economies with respect to all the
except one the price of which is determined endogenously in the model. Since the exogenous
prices do not vary in our analysis, the price vector p is redefined as the scalar price of the
good that is endogenous in the model. henceforth, this good will be referred to as the
non-numeraire good. Market clearing condition for this good is
ma +mb +mc = 0, (4)
8All factors other than land and labor are suppressed in the revenue functions as they do not change in
our analysis. As is well known, the partial derivative of a revenue function with respect to the price of a
good gives the output supply function of that good. Similarly, the partial derivative of a revenue function
with respect to a factor endowment gives the price of that factor. The revenue functions are positive semi-
definite in prices and negative semi-definite in the endowments of the factors of production. In particular,
they satisfy Rijj ≤ 0, for i = a, b, c and j = 2, 3. For these and other properties of revenue functions see
Dixit and Norman (1980).
9The partial derivative of an expenditure function with respect to the price of a good gives the com-
pensated demand function of that good, and that with respect to the utility level is the reciprocal of the
marginal utility of income.
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where the excess demand function mi (≡ Ei1 −Ri1) is the import of the non-numeraire good
in country i (i = a, b, c).
It only remains to explain how war efforts in the two warring countries, Las and L
b
s,
are determined. Following Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001), we assume that each warring
country decides on the levels of its own war effort by maximizing its welfare level, taking
war efforts in the other country and the international prices of the non-numeraire good as
given. The first order conditions are given by:
Ea2
∂ua
∂Las
= −Ra2 +Ra3f1 = 0, (5)
Eb2
∂ub
∂Lbs
= −Rb2 −Rb3f2 = 0. (6)
An increase in Lis, ceteris paribus, increases income in country i (i = a, b) by increasing
the amount of land, but it also has a cost in the sense that it reduces the amount of labor than
can be used for producing goods and services. The first term in (5) and (6) is the marginal
cost of warfare and the second term is the marginal benefit. Equating marginal costs and
benefits yields two reaction functions in the warring countries that are simultaneously solved.
This completes the description of the basic model. There are six endogenous variables,
ua, ub, uc, Las , L
b
s, p, and these six variables are solved for simultaneously using the six
equations (1)-(6).
We conclude this section by deriving our basic welfare equation. Differentiating equa-
tions (1), (2), (3) and (4), we obtain
Ea2 du
a = −madp+Ra3f2dLbs + λdF, (7)
Eb2 du
b = −mbdp−Rb3f1dLas + (1− λ)dF, (8)
(Ec2 − tEc12) duc = − (mc − t (Ec11 −Rc11)) dp+ t (Ec11 −Rc11) dt− dF, (9)
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and
∆ dp = βa dLas + β
b dLbs +
Rc11 − Ec11
1− tccy
dt (10)
+
[
−λcay − (1− λ)cby +
ccy
1− tccy
]
dF,
where
βa = −Ra12 + f1
(
Ra13 −Rb13
)
+ cbyR
b
3f1,
βb = −Rb12 + f2
(
Ra13 −Rb13
)− cayRa3f2,
∆ = S − cayma − cbymb − {mc − t (Ec11 −Rc11)} ·
ccy
1− tccy
,
S =
c∑
i=a
(
Ei11 −Ri11
)
,
ciy =
Ei12
Ei2
, i = a, b, c.
The term S < 0 is the slope of the compensated excess demand function, and the term
∆ is the slope of the uncompensated excess demand function of the non-numeraire good,
which has to be negative for Walrasian stability. The term ciy is the marginal propensity to
consume the non-numeraire good in country i.
The first term on the right hand side of (7)-(9) captures the well-known terms-of-
trade effect on utility: an exporter (importer) of the non-numeraire good is better off, if the
international price of the good increases (decreases). The second term in (7) and (8) gives
the international conflict externality from war effort on the two warring countries. Higher
war effort by one country, ceteris paribus, reduces utility in the other warring country by
reducing the endowment of land in the latter. However, higher war effort in a country has
no effect on its own welfare as war effort in optimally chosen. Note that war effort affects
the utility in the donor country only through changes in the international terms of trade.
The direct effect of foreign aid is to reduce welfare in the donor country and increase that
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in the recipient countries, and these effects are given by the last term in (7)-(9). Finally,
the second term on the right hand side of (9) is the effect of a change in tariffs in the donor
country on tariff revenue; an increase in tariffs reduces the volume of imports and thus tariff
revenue.
The last term on the right hand side of (10) captures the effect of foreign aid on the
international terms of trade. This effect can be explained as follows. An increase in aid
reduces income in the donor country and reduces those in the recipient countries; the former
reducing the demand for the non-numeraire good and the latter increasing it. The net effect
on the world demand for the non-numeraire good depends on the relative magnitudes of the
marginal propensities to consume in the three countries.10 The next-to-last term on the
right hand side of (10) captures the revenue effect of an increase in tariffs. An increase in t
reduces tariff revenue and thus demand in the donor country as mentioned before, and thus
its effect on p is negative. Finally, from the first two terms in (10), we see that the effect of
an increase in war efforts in the two countries on p is ambiguous. We shall only explain the
effect of an increase in Las on p and the effect of L
b
s can be similarly explained. An increase
in the employment of soldiers reduces the supply of workers for the private sector and this
reduces output of the non-numeraire good if and only if Ra12 > 0. This reduction in output
will increase p by reducing the world supply of the non-numeraire good. The first term in
βa captures this effect. The second term in βa gives the effect via changes in the endowment
of land in the two countries. An increase in Las increases the supply of land in country
a and reduces that in country b, and the effect of the world supply of the non-numeraire
good is given by Ra13 − Rb13. An increase in Las also has two income effects on p that come
from capturing more of the land endowment. The own-income effect disappears because of
the envelope property, and the third term in βa gives the effect from changes in income in
country b: an increase in Las reduces income in country b and thus the world demand and
the price of the non-numeraire good.
10These effects of an aid have been discussed extensively in the literature on the Transfer Paradox (see,
for example, Bhagwati et al. (1983)).
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3 Globalization and war with two small open economies
In this section, we examine the effect of globalization on the war efforts of two countries
engaged in conflict, assuming that they are small open economies that face an exogenous
terms of trade. In other words, the price of the non-numeraire good, p, is taken as exogenous
and we ignore equations (4) and (10). It is to be noted that in this case, globalization or
a reduction in trade costs in a country is equivalent to an improvement in its international
terms of trade (see Copeland and Taylor (2003)) and so we analyze the effect of a change in
p on the equilibrium.
Differentiating the reaction functions of the warring countries (5) and (6) results in:
α1dL
a
s + α2dL
b
s = α3dp, (11)
α4dL
a
s + α5dL
b
s = α6dp, (12)
where
α1 = R
a
22 − 2f1Ra23 +Ra3f11 + (f1)2Ra33 < 0,
α2 = −Ra23f2 +Ra3f12 + f1f2Ra33,
α3 = R
a
21 − f1Ra31,
α4 = R
b
23f1 −Rb3f21 + f1f2Rb33 > 0,
α5 = R
b
22 + 2f2R
b
23 −Rb3f22 + (f2)2Rb33 < 0,
α6 = R
b
21 + f2R
b
31.
Note that α1 < 0 and α5 < 0 because of the second order conditions in the deter-
mination of Las and L
b
s respectively. Also, α4 is positive since we assumed that f12 < 0.
Thus, the reaction function in country a is upward sloping. We also assume that α2 > 0
so that the the reaction function in country b is also upward sloping. That is, employment
of soldiers is a strategic complement in both countries. If the non-numeraire good is more
9
labor intensive in both countries, then Ri21 > 0 and R
i
31 < 0 for i = a, b and thus α3 > 0 and
α6 > 0.
11
Solving (11) and (12), we obtain
∆s · dL
a
s
dp
= α3α5 − α6α2, (13)
∆s · dL
b
s
dp
= α1α6 − α3α4, (14)
where ∆s = α1α5 − α2α4 > 0 for the stability of the Nash equilibrium.
From (13) and (14) it follows that if the non-numeraire good is labor intensive in
both countries, we have dLas/dp < 0 and dL
b
s/dp < 0. In other words, an increase in p will
reduce the equilibrium number of soldiers in both countries. The intuition for these results
is quite straightforward. An increase in p increases wage rates, and reduces rental rates on
land, in the two warring countries if the non-numeraire good is labor intensive (the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem). Thus, when the non-numeraire good is labor intensive, an increase in
p raises the marginal cost and reduces the marginal benefit of warfare in both countries,
and thus reduces their equilibrium war efforts. By similar arguments it can be shown that
dLas/dp > 0 and dL
b
s/dp > 0 if the non-numeraire good is land intensive in the two countries.
As for the welfare of the warring countries, from (7) and (8) we get
Ea2 du
a = −madp+Ra3f2dLbs, (15)
Eb2 du
b = −mbdp−Rb3f1dLas . (16)
If both countries are exporters of the labor-intensive non-numeraire good, we have
ma < 0, mb < 0 and Ri21 > 0, R
i
31 < 0, i = a, b. In this case, improvements in the
terms of trade of the two countries imply dp > 0, and a terms-of-trade improvement will
reduce the employment of soldiers in both countries. Thus, a terms-of-trade improvement
11In a many-good, many-factor model, the terminology labor intensive can be misleading. In this paper,
we call the non-numeraire good more labor intensive in country i if Ri12 > 0 > R
i
13, i = a, b. By contrast, if
the non-numeraire good more land intensive in country i, Ri21 < 0 < R
i
31 which implies α3 < 0 and α6 < 0.
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has two positive effects on welfare in the two countries: (i) a rise in welfare due to a terms-
of-trade improvement (the first term in (15) and (16)), and (ii) a positive indirect effect via
reductions in war efforts (the second term in (15) and (16)). In other words, a terms-of-trade
improvement enhances welfare by encouraging exports and freeing up manpower from war
production for export production. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that two small open economies export the labor-intensive good.
Then trade liberalization in the two countries reduces war efforts in both countries and is
strictly Pareto improving.
The above result has an important implication for developing countries, where the
incidence of warfare is much higher than elsewhere . Given that most developing countries
typically export labor-intensive basic goods, the process of globalization is likely to reduce
incentives for them to engage in conflicts with their neighbors. By contrast, exporters of
a land-intensive good will reduce war effort only when its international price falls. If we
follow Skaperdas and Syropolous (2001) and interpret the land-intensive good as oil or some
other valuable natural resource, then our model suggests that for exporters of resource-
intensive goods, trade liberalization actually encourages war, although the terms-of-trade
effect continues to exert a positive effect on welfare. The net effect of globalization on the
welfare of a country that exports a land-intensive good depends on the relative magnitudes
of the terms-of-trade effect and the conflict externality.
4 The case of large open economies
In this section we assume, as in section 3, that countries a and b decide on the levels of
its soldiers — Las and L
b
s respectively — in a non-cooperative manner taking the terms of
trade as given. However, the terms of trade is endogenous in the present case. The reaction
functions of the two countries are given, as before, by equations (5) and (6) respectively, and
11
equations (13) and (14) still hold in the present case. Substituting (13) and (14) into (10),
we get
∆1 dp =
Rc11 − Ec11
1− tccy
dt+
[
−λcay − (1− λ)cby +
ccy
1− tccy
]
dF, (17)
where
∆1 = ∆− β
a(α3α5 − α6α2) + βb(α1α6 − α3α4)
∆s
is negative for Walrasian stability.12
Comparing (17) with (10), we see that internalizing the effect of war efforts on p does
not alter the qualitative nature of the effects of aid and tariffs on p. This is because aid and
tariffs have no direct effect on war efforts and because aid and tariffs affect war efforts only
through induced changes in p.
Having derived the terms-of-trade equation in (17), we now consider four scenarios
that are of interest for conflict reduction. In the first scenario we examine the effect of a
coordinated reduction in war efforts on the welfare levels in the three countries, starting from
the war equilibrium described above. In the last three scenarios we examine how actions
by the third country affect the level of conflict and welfare. We consider three possible
actions: (i) the amount of foreign aid is increased (‘carrots’), (ii) the level of tariffs on
imports from the warring countries is increased (‘sticks’), and (ii) both the carrot and the
stick instruments are used at the same time. These exercises are taken up in turn in the
following four subsections.
For all of the scenarios below, for simplicity, we shall assume that the two warring
countries are identical.13 The symmetry assumption implies f1 = −f2. We shall also assume
that the changes in war efforts are also the same, i.e., dLaa = dL
b
s.
12The term ∆1 is the slope of the uncompensated excess world demand function of the non-numeraire
good, taking into account the price effects produced by changes in war effort.
13Strictly speaking, we do not need the two countries to be identical. All we need is preferences and
technologies to be the same in the two countries, and endowments to lie in the same cone of diversification,
so that factor-price equalization occurs.
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4.1 The effect of war on the third country
In this subsection we shall examine the effect of a bilateral, concerted and piecemeal reduction
in war efforts in the two warring countries from their equilibrium levels on the welfare level
in the third country (country c) which does not take part in the war, but trades with the
two warring countries.
From (9) and (10) it follows that increases in war efforts will increase welfare if and
only if these actions improve the terms of trade of the third country. The terms-of-trade
effect under symmetry is derived from (10) as
p∆ dp = 2Ra2(pc
a
y − ²a)dLas , (18)
where ²a (= Ra12p/R
a
2) is the elasticity of wage rate of labor with respect to the price of the
non-numeraire good.
As discussed before, a change in war effort has three effects. War effort induces
changes in (i) the supply of labor for the private sectors, (ii) the supply of land, and (iii)
income effects on the demand for the non-numeraire good. Because the gain of land by one
country i is a loss to the other, effect (ii) disappears under the assumption of symmetry
because f(x, x) = 0, ∀x, and we are left with effects (i) and (iii). If pcay < ²a, — i.e., if the
marginal propensity to spend on the non-numeraire good (pcay) in the warring countries is
less than the price elasticity of wage rate of labor in these countries — the income effect is
dominated by the effect through changes in labor supply and the net effect of reduction in
war efforts on price is a negative one. In other words, a decrease in Las and L
b
s will reduce p
if and only if pcay < ²
a. Thus, under the same necessary and sufficient condition, decreased
war efforts in the warring countries will increase the welfare level in country c if it is an
importer of the non-numeraire good. If country c is an exporter of the non-numeraire good,
then decreased war efforts in the warring countries will decrease the welfare level in country
c if and only if pcay < ²
a. Formally,
13
Proposition 2 Bilateral concerted reductions in war efforts will enhance the welfare of the
third neutral country if and only if (pcay − ²a)mc < 0.
In a Heckscher-Ohlin world, how pcay relates to ²
a depends on the the relative factor
intensities. In fact, one can show that pcay < ²
a if and only if the non-numeraire good is
labor intensive. To see this, note that if the non-numeraire good is labor intensive, then the
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem tells us that ²a > 1 (the so-called ‘magnification effect’). This
implies that pcay < ²
a, because pcay < 1 if the numeraire good is normal. If, on the other
hand, the non-numeraire good is land intensive, it follows from the same theorem that ²a < 0
and thus pcay > ²
a, assuming that the non-numeraire good is normal.
To summarize, in a Heckscher-Ohlin world, bilateral concerted reductions in war
efforts will increase the welfare of the third neutral country if and only if the warring countries
export the labor-intensive good. And thus, we conclude that the third country prefers peace
if the warring parties are exporters of a labor-intensive good. By the same arguments, the
third country prefers war if the warring parties are exporters of a land-intensive good. This
suggests that the incentives for third parties may well be different in conflicts in different
parts of the world.
4.2 Sticks and war
In this section, we assume that country c optimally chooses the level of tariffs whereas the
warring countries choose the levels of soldiers optimally as given by (5) and (6). The three
decisions are simultaneous. The optimality condition for t is given by:14
(Ec2 − tEc12) ·
∂uc
∂t
= − (mc − t (Ec11 −Rc11)) ·
∂p
∂t
+ t (Ec11 −Rc11) = 0, (19)
where from (17), we have
∂p
∂t
=
Rc11 − Ec11
∆1(1− tccy)
< 0. (20)
14Equation (19) gives the standard optimal tariff formula (‘inverse-elasticity rule’) for a large country with
monopoly power in trade.
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With the Nash equilibrium just described as the starting point, we now consider the
effect of a decrease in tariffs in country c on war efforts in countries a and b. Here we assume
the trade pattern considered in Proposition 1, where countries a and b are exporters of the
labor-intensive non-numeraire good and country c is the importer of it.
From (20), it follows a decrease in t will increase p, i.e., improve the terms of trade in
countries a and b. An increase in t increases domestic producers’ and consumers’ prices of the
non-numeraire good and thus its demand. It has been shown before that an improvement in
the terms of trade reduces the employment of soldiers and increases welfare in both warring
countries if the warring countries export the labor-intensive non-numeraire good. Also, due
to the envelope property, this decrease in t has no effect on the welfare level in country c.
These results are formally stated below.
Proposition 3 Suppose that two warring countries export the labor-intensive good to the
third country. Then a reduction in trade restrictions from the Nash optimum by the third
country reduces war efforts in both warring countries and is Pareto superior.
The above proposition suggests that sticks in the form of trade sanctions against the
warring countries are counter-productive, and that more open trade is beneficial for all. As
argued above, this situation applies to conflicts for many developing countries that tend
to be exporters of labor-intensive basic goods. However, for reasons similar to the ones
mentioned before, trade sanctions will reduce war efforts if the warring countries export
the land-intensive good. However, the effect of trade sanctions on the welfare level of such
countries will depend on the relative magnitudes of the conflict externality and the terms-
of-trade effect.
4.3 Carrots and war
In this section, we assume that country c attempts to reduce war efforts in countries a and
b by giving them foreign aid F . For simplicity, we set t = 0 in this case and assume the two
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warring countries to be symmetric.15 We also continue to assume that countries a and b are
exporters of the labor-intensive non-numeraire good and country c is the importer of it.
From (17), setting cay = c
b
y (symmetry), we have
∆1 · ∂p
∂F
= ccy − cay. (21)
From (21) it follows that ∂p/∂F > 0 if and only if cay > c
c
y. That is, an increase in
F will improve the terms of trade in countries a and b if and only if the warring countries
spend a higher fraction on the non-numeraire good than the neutral importer of the good.
We have already explained the channels through which foreign aid affects p. It has also been
shown that an improvement in the terms of trade reduces the employment of soldiers. As
for the effects on welfare levels of the warring countries, from (7) and (5) we find that for
country a (by symmetry, a similar equation holds for country b)
Ea2 du
a = −madp−Ra3f1dLas + λdF, (22)
and thus welfare increases in the two warring countries as a result of an increase in F if
cay > c
c
y. These results are formally stated next:
Proposition 4 Suppose that two warring countries are identical and export the labor-
intensive good to the third country. Then an increase in foreign aid by the third country
to the warring countries reduces war efforts in both countries if and only if cay > c
c
y. Fur-
thermore, such an increase in foreign aid increases welfare in the two recipient countries if
cay > c
c
y.
If the non-numeraire good is a basic good (which is labor intensive and which the two
warring countries export), it is quite reasonable to assume that cay > c
c
y if the two warring
countries are developing countries and the third country is a developed one.
15Thus, we abstract from the tariff revenue effects when aid is altered. Such effects are considered in the
next section when both instruments are changed simultaneously.
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4.4 Carrots and sticks
In the preceding two subsections, we have seen that either a reduction in tariffs or an increase
in foreign aid would reduce war efforts. Although the response of war effort to a tariff
reduction is unambiguous, the response of war effort to an increase in foreign aid depends
on the relative magnitudes of the marginal propensities to consume in the three countries.
In this subsection we consider a policy initiative in country c that involves both carrots and
sticks at the same time.16 We consider two ways of relating changes in the two instruments.
In the first case, the instruments are changed keeping government revenue constant and in
the second case, welfare in country c is kept constant. These two cases are now taken up in
turn in the following two subsections.
4.4.1 Revenue-neutral changes in carrots and sticks
We assume that country c changes both the level of aid and tariffs in such a way that its
revenue, evaluated at the initial equilibrium, remains constant, i.e., dt and dF satisfy
dF = mcdt. (23)
Substituting (23) in (9), we get
(Ec2 − tEc12) duc = −{mc − t (Ec11 −Rc11)} d(p+ t). (24)
With this assumption, substituting (23) in (17) we obtain
∆1 · dp
dt
=
Rc11 − Ec11
1− tccy
+mc
{
ccy
1− tccy
− cay
}
, (25)
∆1
2
· d(p+ t)
dt
= Ea11 −Ra11 − βa ·
dLas
dp
. (26)
16The exercise in this subsection can be seen as related to the literature on trade versus aid. Johnson
(1967) was possibly the first to analyze the issue. He concluded that, ignoring secondary repercussions,
a unit of foreign exchange from exports can never be as valuable (in terms of welfare) as a unit of foreign
exchange from foreign aid. More recently, Kemp and Shimomura (1991) extend the Johnson analysis in a
more formal model of international trade.
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From equation (25) and (26), the following observations can be made. Suppose that
the two warring countries export the labor-intensive non-numeraire good, i.e., ma < 0, mb <
0 and mc > 0. Under this assumption, it has been shown that dLas/dp < 0. Furthermore,
if ccy/(1 − tccy) > cay, it follows from (25) that dp/dt < 0. That is, a decrease in both t
and F according to the rule (23) will increase p and thus decrease Las . In other words, when
ccy/(1−tccy) > cay, fewer sticks and fewer carrots reduces war efforts. Note that ccy/(1−tccy) > cay
is only a sufficient condition, and even when this condition is not satisfied we will still have
dp/dt < 0 as long as the import elasticity of demand for the non-numeraire good in country
ccy (= −(Ec11 −Rc11)(p+ t)/mc) is sufficiently large.
For the rest of the analysis, we shall assume that it is in the interest of the rest of
the world (third country) that war efforts of the warring countries are reduced and that the
identical warring countries export the labor-intensive good. From proposition 2 it follows
that these assumptions are equivalent to assuming that pcay < ²
a. From the definition of βa
and βb in (10), it also follows that if countries a and b are identical βa < 0 and βb < 0 if and
only if pcay < ²
a. Thus, henceforth we shall assume that βa = βb < 0.
Turning to the effects on welfare, since βa < 0 if the non-numeraire good is labor
intensive, from (26) it then follows that d(p+ t)/dt > 0 under the set of conditions described
in the previous paragraph. This last result, in view of (25), implies that the aforementioned
reform of t and F will increase the welfare of country c. As for the welfare of the warring
countries, there are three effects; (i) they benefit from a terms-of-trade improvement (first
term in (7)), (ii) reduction in war efforts increase their welfare through the conflict externality
(third term in (7)), and (iii) the reduction in the amount of aid has a direct negative effect
on their welfare (fourth term in (7)).17 Given the symmetry between countries a and b, the
net effect can be simplified as
2∆1E
a
2 du
a = mcd(p+ t) + 2Rb3dL
b
s,
17Note that the second term in (7) disappears as Lsa is optimally chosen.
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where the two terms are opposite in sign. If the first effect dominates, then an increase in
both t and F will increase welfare in the two warring countries, but war efforts will increase.
When the second effect dominates, a decrease in both t and F will reduce war efforts and
increase welfare in the two warring countries. These results are formally stated as:
Proposition 5 Suppose that two identical warring countries export the labor-intensive good
to the third country. Then a revenue-neutral decrease in the levels of both aid and tariffs
satisfying (23) will reduce the level of war efforts in the two countries and increase the welfare
of the third country if ccy/(1− tccy) > cay. Under the same conditions, the present reform may
also increase welfare levels in the two warring countries. When ccy/(1− tccy) < cay, a revenue-
neutral decrease in the levels of both aid and tariffs will reduce the level of war efforts if the
import elasticity of demand for the non-numeraire good in the third country is sufficiently
high.
As before, if the non-numeraire good is a basic good (which is labor intensive and
which the two warring countries export), it is quite reasonable to assume that cay is high and
ccy is low if the two warring countries are developing countries and the third country is a
developed one. However, the condition ccy/(1 − tccy) > cay is only a sufficient one, and even
under realistic situations, a revenue-neutral decrease in the levels of both aid and tariffs will
reduce the level of war efforts if the import elasticity of demand is sufficiently high.
We note that revenue-neutral reductions tariffs and foreign aid are only Pareto su-
perior if the war externalities are sufficiently large in the warring countries. Otherwise, the
neutral country benefits at the expense of the warring countries in terms of welfare. Thus,
though there exists incentives for the third party to target war reduction by reducing tariffs
and aid, the warring countries may not be in favor of such policy reforms.
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4.4.2 Welfare-neutral changes in carrots and sticks
In this subsection, we assume that country c changes the two instruments at its disposal in
a such a way that leaves its welfare level given in (9) unchanged, i.e., dt and dF are chosen
such that
(mc − t (Ec11 −Rc11)) dp = −dF + t (Ec11 −Rc11) dt, (27)
where dp is given in (17).
Using (5) and (27), we get from (7) and (9)
dp
dt
= − (1 + tc
b
y)(E
c
11 −Rc11)
2(Ea11 −Ra11) + (Ec11 −Rc11)(1 + tcby)− 2βa dL
a
s
dp
, (28)
d(p+ t)
dt
=
2(Ea11 −Ra11)− 2βa dL
a
s
dp
2(Ea11 −Ra11) + (Ec11 −Rc11)(1 + tcby)− 2βa dL
a
s
dp
, (29)
2Ea2 ·
dua
dt
= 2Ra3f2 ·
dLbs
dt
+ t(Ec11 −Rc11) ·
d(p+ t)
dt
, (30)
Under the assumptions made, ma < 0, mb < 0 and mc > 0, dLas/dp < 0, and β
a < 0.
Thus, from (28)-(30) we have dp/dt < 0, d(p+ t)/dt > 0 and dua/dt < 0. In other words, a
decrease in t will increase the terms of trade of the warring countries, reduce their war efforts,
and increase their welfare levels. how foreign aid moves to satisfy (27) when tariffs fall will
depend on whether the initial level of the tariff is higher or lower than its non-cooperative
optimal level. To be specific, the welfare-neutral rule (27) implies that a reduction in t will
be accompanied by a reduction (expansion) in F if the initial level of tariff is lower (higher)
than its optimal level. The results of this subsection are formally stated in the following:
Proposition 6 Suppose that two identical warring countries export the labor-intensive good
to the third country. Then a welfare-neutral decrease in the levels of tariffs satisfying (27)
will reduce the level of war efforts and increase welfare levels in the two countries. Such a
decrease in tariff will be accompanied by a decrease (increase) in foreign aid if the initial
level of tariff is lower (higher) than its non-cooperative optimal level.
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To summarize, we find that a decrease in tariffs in the present case would be welcome
by all parties. However, the accompanying change in foreign aid is negative if the initial
level of tariffs imposed by country c is ‘low’. In other words, donor countries will withhold
aid to promote peace if they are initially friendly toward trade.
5 Conclusion
Unfortunately, bilateral wars between countries over disputed territory is not uncommon
and the international community often — though not always — takes an active role in
attempting to resolve such conflicts. The interest is not selfless, because conflicts can have
important economic consequences on other countries that trade with the warring countries.
The willingness for third parties to actively engage in conflict resolution can depend on
whether or not they themselves lose from such conflicts. In this paper we focus on the crucial
role of a third country in the resolution of a conflict between two warring countries. Can
the third party help resolve conflicts by using carrots such as foreign aid and sticks such as
trade sanctions? Which of the two instruments is likely to be more effective in the resolution
of conflicts? These are some of the issues that this paper has attempted to address. We do
so by developing a general three-country, many-good, many-factor trade-theoretic model of
international trade in which the level of the conflict is determined endogenously as a Nash
equilibrium.
We start our analysis by examining the effect of globalization on conflict and find
that under realistic assumptions for many countries, reduction in trade costs for the warring
countries is likely to reduce the level of conflict between them. We also derive a necessary
and sufficient condition under which a concerted, piecemeal reduction in war efforts in the
two warring countries from their Nash equilibrium levels is welfare-enhancing for the third
country. Once again, we find that under realistic assumptions on the pattern of trade that
apply to many countries, the third country will gain from reduction in war efforts.
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Then we move on to the main issues of the paper, viz., can the third party reduce
the level of conflicts by using carrot or stick policies? We consider two possible instruments
for the third country: trade sanctions (stick) and foreign aid (carrot). When the two instru-
ments are used one at a time, we find that whereas a reduction in trade sanctions would
unambiguously reduce war efforts and be strictly Pareto improving, an increase in foreign
aid would have similar effects only under certain (albeit realistic) situations. Finally, we
consider the situation where the two instruments are used simultaneously. When the in-
struments are changed in a revenue-neutral way, a reduction in both tariffs and aid will
reduce conflict, under certain conditions. However, when the changes are welfare-neutral for
the third country, a reduction in tariffs will always reduce war efforts and such a policy is
Pareto improving. However, such a reduction in tariffs needs to be accompanied by either
a reduction in aid or an increase in aid depending on whether the initial level of tariff is low
or high.
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